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ABSTRACT
We study decentralized learning in organizations. Decentralization is captured through a symme-
try constraint on agents’ strategies. Among such attainable strategies, we solve for optimal and
equilibrium strategies. We model the organization as a repeated game with imperfectly observable
actions. A ﬁx e db u tu n k n o w ns u b s e to fa c t i o np r o ﬁles are successes and all other action proﬁles
are failures. The game is played until either there is a success or the time horizon is reached. For
any time horizon, including inﬁnity, we demonstrate existence of optimal attainable strategies and
show that they are Nash equilibria. For some time horizons, we can solve explicitly for the optimal
attainable strategies and show uniqueness. The solution connects the learning behavior of agents
to the fundamentals that characterize the organization: Agents in the organization respond more
slowly to failure as the future becomes more important, the size of the organization increases and
the probability of success decreases.
∗We enjoyed talking to Paul Heidhues and Andy McLennan. This version was created January 31, 2002. The
views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1 Introduction
Organizations are groups of agents linked by a common purpose (North [1994]). An orga-
nization will be more successful at achieving the common goal, the better its members can
coordinate their actions. Institutions like hierarchies and information systems help in solving
an organization’s coordination problems. But inevitably some of the decision making in an
organization will remain decentralized.
Because of decentralization, organizations will behave diﬀerently from individuals, cer-
tain tasks are more diﬃcult for organizations than for individuals and, more generally, the
behavior of an organization may depend on its size. Even in an organization whose produc-
tion function is known, coordinating actions may be nontrivial if there are multiple optimal
combinations. The organization’s task is more challenging if the organization has to search
for an optimal production plan.
Day and Tinney [1968] study decentralized learning in a ﬁrm with two independent deci-
sion makers. Their decision makers respond to success and failure by modifying their decision
rules until a satisﬁcing criterion is met. They examine the roles of “caution,” “daring” and
“failure response” and show that “learning - tempered by caution in response to failure” can
eventually solve the ﬁrm’s problem. Milgrom and Roberts [1990a] describe the coordination
problem of a team of managers that has to adapt to changing technological opportunities.
They show that if the production function is supermodular, adaptive dynamics will ﬁnd the
ﬁrm’s optimum. Outside of economics, there is considerable interest in concurrent learning in
multiagent environments in the computer science literature. For example, Sen and Sekaran
[1998] investigate reinforcement learning in multiagent systems.
None of these approaches attempt either to predict the learning rule or to prescribe an
optimal rule. Indeed, these questions are not well-posed in these models. Day and Tinney’s
learning rules are primitives of their model. The computer science literature, e.g., Sen and
Sekaran, emphasizes domain independence and robustness. Milgrom and Roberts focus on
the outcomes achievable through learning and do not impose restrictions on learning rules
that would distinguish “optimal learning” from going straight to the ﬁrm’s optimum. We
impose such constraints and show that the investigation of optimal learning in organizations
is both meaningful and interesting. In particular, we will be able to say just how “daring”
1individuals in the organization ought to be and how decisively the they should respond to
failure. Moreover, we get to connect these predictions to the fundamental parameters of the
model: the discount factor, the size of the organization and the success probability.
We study decentralized learning in organizations. We require agents to learn by trial and
error. They can observe only success or failure and not the actions taken by other agents.
A failure means that the organizations will want to explore a novel action combination.
Decentralization means that agents change their actions independently. Therefore it may be
unclear which members have to change their actions and, given the observational restrictions,
which agents do change their actions. The learning activities of some agents may confound
the learning of others.
Decentralization is captured through a symmetry constraint on agents’ strategies, called
attainability, that was introduced by Crawford and Haller [1990] (CH in the sequel). An
attainable strategy respects at any point in time whatever symmetries remain in the game.
Among learning rules satisfying the symmetry constraints, we are interested in optimal rules.
Formally, we analyze a repeated n-player game in which a ﬁxed but unknown subset of action
proﬁles are successes a n da l lo t h e ra c t i o np r o ﬁles are failures. The game is played until either
there is a success or the time horizon, T, is reached.
If agents use expected present discounted values to evaluate outcomes in the repeated
game, we ﬁnd for any time horizon, including inﬁnity, that optimal attainable strategies
exist and that they form equilibria. Our central result is a characterization of optimal and
equilibrium attainable strategies when each agent has two actions and T =3 . We show
that there is a unique optimal attainable strategy and that it coincides with the unique
equilibrium attainable strategy. This strategy is parameterized by the discount factor, δ, the
number of members of the organization, n, and the number of success proﬁles, k. We ﬁnd
that agents in an organization respond more slowly to failure as the future becomes more
important, the size of the organization increases and the probability of success decreases.
If we require sequential rationality, then for δ =0 ,n=2a n da n yT, there exists
an optimal equilibrium attainable with an interesting simple structure: Agents alternate
between switching with probability one and with probability one-half until either there is a
success or the time-horizon is reached. Further, every optimal attainable strategy has this
2property. All solutions for suﬃciently small δ approximate this δ = 0 solution. Finally, in
this environment, if we permit some regard for the future by giving agents lexicographic
preferences for early success, the optimal attainable strategy remains the same, but no
attainable Nash equilibrium exists.
Except when δ =0 , attainable equilibria tend to be complex. The unique attainable
equilibrium for T = 3 is not in public strategies. More generally, plausible heuristics, like
always switching with a ﬁxed probability, do not give rise to equilibria.
2 The Game and Restrictions on Strategies
We consider a repeated n-player, m-action game. In the stage game, the players, i ∈ I,
have actions aij,j=1 ,...,m and identical payoﬀs from each action combination a =
(a1j1,...,a njn). All action combinations are either failures or successes. Each player’s payoﬀ
ui(a,θ) in the stage game depends on the action proﬁle a and the random variable θ which
t a k e sv a l u e si nX and determines which k proﬁles are successes. At a success, all players earn
ap a y o ﬀ 1 and at a failure they all get 0. The number of successes is commonly known but not
their location. Any assignment of the given number of successes across action combinations
is equally likely.
In the repeated game the random assignment of successes to action proﬁl e si sd e t e r m i n e d
once-and-for-all before the ﬁrst play of the game. The stage game is repeated in periods
t =0 ,1,...,T,until either a success is played once or the time horizon T is reached.1 Note
that period 0 is the ﬁrst period; period 1, the second period; and so on. We consider both
ﬁnite and inﬁnite T. Denote the repeated game with time horizon T by ΓT. Players observe
only their own actions and their own payoﬀs, not the actions of the other player. We assume
that players maximize the expected present discounted value of future payoﬀsw i t h0≤ δ < 1;
except where indicated, we assume that δ > 0. Thus preferences over strategy proﬁles have
a utility function representation, which is of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type.2
Let Ai be player i’s set of actions in the stage game and S = {0,c} the set of possible
1For most of our results there is a version that holds for more standard repeated games that continue
until the time horizon is reached regardless of the number of successes. However, our approach of ending
the game as soon as there is a success considerably sharpens the statement of results.
2Toward the end we will also brieﬂy comment on lexicographic preferences for early success.
3payoﬀ realizations in the stage game, failure and success. We adopt the convention that
after a success, histories record the null event “nothing happens” in each period until the
ﬁnal period T is reached. Since players can observe only success or failure in addition to
their own actions, their strategies can depend only on their private histories ht
i ∈ At
i × St.
Let ht := (ht
1,...,ht
n) be an entire history ending in period t, and denote an inﬁnite history
by h. Let H stand for the set of all inﬁnite histories.












i ×St−1 and a ∈ Ai, let ft
i(h
t−1
i )(a) denote the probability that player i’s strategy assigns
to his action a after history h
t−1
i .
Doing well in this game means that players quickly ﬁnd a success. They will want to
avoid action combinations that have led to failures in the past. They will want to learn
from their failures. With only a single player, someone directing the organization, or some
other mechanism coordinating the organization, this is accomplished by trying a new action
combination in each period until there is a success. With decentralized decision making by
two agents this search process is made diﬃcult by the fact that agents won’t know who
took the wrong action: agent 1, agent 2, or both. With more than two agents the diﬃculty
increases because any subset of the set of agents could have taken a wrong action.
We use symmetry to capture the non-negligible strategic uncertainty that players are
facing. In particular, since we do not permit prior communication or any other prior inter-
action, symmetries of the game can be removed only through interactions in the game. As
a consequence, up to a bijection between their action spaces, Ai and Ai0,a n yt w op l a y e r s
i and i0 will use identical strategies, and each player i’s strategy is deﬁned only up to a
permutation of Ai. Formally, these two conditions amount to













i ))(˜ ρ(a)), ∀ bijections ˜ ρ : Ai → Ai.
We call strategy proﬁles that satisfy our restrictions attainable. Strategy proﬁles that
maximize players’ payoﬀs among the set of attainable strategies will be called optimal at-
tainable strategies. Attainable strategy proﬁles that are Nash equilibria are referred to as
4equilibrium attainable strategy proﬁles. Note that when we check for equilibrium we impose
no restrictions on deviations; the symmetry restrictions apply only on the solution path,
whether it is optimal or equilibrium. Our goal is to characterize optimal attainable strat-
egy proﬁles and equilibrium attainable strategy proﬁles in repeated success-or-failure games.
Individual strategies will be called attainable if they satisfy the second condition. Since play-
ers have to use identical strategies we will often limit our discussion to individual strategies
rather than entire proﬁles. We denote the set of attainable behavior strategies of player i in
a T-period success-or-failure game by FT
i and the set of attainable strategy proﬁles by FT.
Since payoﬀs in the stage game are bounded and future payoﬀs are discounted with
discount factor δ < 1, the repeated success-or-failure game is continuous at inﬁnity (see
Fudenberg and Levine [1983]), i.e., behavior in the far distant future has a vanishing eﬀect
on payoﬀs. Formally, if V i(x,h) is the payoﬀ of player i in the inﬁnite horizon game as a
function of the realization, x, of the random variable θ and the history h and h(τ)d e n o t e s
the truncation of the inﬁnite history h after period τ, then the game is continuous at inﬁnity
if
sup




0)| → 0a sτ →∞ .
This continuity property will be used in the next section to help establish existence of optimal
attainable strategies and of equilibrium attainable strategies.
Any behavior strategy proﬁle f induces a probability πt(f) of a success in period t, taking
into account that a success ends the game. Note that it suﬃces to write this probability as
πt(f0,...,ft), that is, as a function of behavior only up to and including period t. In the








For any two strategies f and g denote by g(f,τ) the strategy obtained from g by following
f until period τ and g thereafter. Then, as a consequence of continuity at inﬁnity we have
the following property: For any ²>0, there exists τ0 such that
sup
f,g
|Π(f) − Π(g(f,τ))| <² ∀τ > τ0.
53 Optimal Attainable Strategies: Existence and Rela-
tion to Equilibrium
In this section we establish the existence of optimal attainable strategies in repeated success-
or-failure games for any time horizon and show that optimal attainable strategies are Nash
equilibrium strategies. This conveniently establishes the existence of equilibrium attainable
strategies.3
We begin by proving existence of optimal attainable strategies. The idea is simple: We
have to show that a constrained optimization problem has a solution. This will be the case
if the objective function and constraint set are well behaved.
Proposition 1 An optimal attainable strategy exists in any repeated success-or-failure game
with discounting.
Proof. At a given information set, a behavior strategy speciﬁes a probability distribution
with ﬁnite support. The space of such probability distributions is compact. The attainability
constraints at that information set are linear. Therefore, at any given information set, the
set of probability distributions induced by an attainable behavior strategy is a closed subset
of a compact set and therefore compact.
The space FT of attainable behavior strategy proﬁles is a product of the spaces of attain-
able behavior strategies which itself is a product of the attainable probability distributions
at each information set. Therefore by Tychonoﬀ’s Theorem FT is compact in the product
topology.4
In the ﬁnite horizon case the payoﬀ function Π(·) is clearly continuous relative to the
product topology. Hence, in this case, ﬁnding an optimal attainable strategy amounts to
maximizing a continuous function over a compact set. A solution exists by Weierstrass’
Theorem.
For the inﬁnite horizon case, note that since F∞ is a countable product, F∞ endowed
with the product topology is metrizable. Recall that in a metrizable space compactness
3While the equilibrium property of optimal attainable strategies is convenient and intuitive, it deserves
emphasis that this link may fail, despite the common interest among players, if players use criteria other
than expected present discounted values to evaluate outcomes in the repeated game. An interesting case
where this occurs is that of lexicographic preferences for early success.
4For this and later references to topology see, e.g., Munkres [1975].
6implies sequential compactness.
Let f∗
T be an optimal attainable strategy in ΓT for ﬁnite T. Let ˜ f∗
T be the extension
of f∗
T to Γ∞ that is obtained by prescribing uniform randomization at every information
set after time T. Since F∞ is sequentially compact, the sequence { ˜ f∗
T}∞
T=1 has a convergent
subsequence. Denote this sequence (after reindexing) by { ˜ f∗
T}∞
T=1 as well and its limit by ˜ f.
Note that ˜ f is attainable.
In order to obtain a contradiction, suppose there exists an attainable proﬁle ˆ f and an
²>0s u c ht h a tΠ( ˆ f)−Π( ˜ f) >² .Let ˆ fT and ˜ fT denote the strategies obtained from ˆ f and ˜ f
by truncating after T periods and prescribing uniform randomization thereafter. Since the
payoﬀ function is continuous at inﬁnity, there exists a T such that for all T>T , we have





n) is a bounded increasing sequence and therefore converges. Denote the limit by
Π∗. Let ˜ f∗
n,T denote the strategy obtained from ˜ f∗
n by truncating after period T and pre-
scribing uniform randomization thereafter. Because convergence in the product topology
implies pointwise convergence, for any T, ˜ f∗
n,T converges to ˜ fT.S i n c eΠ is continuous in the
arguments referring to the ﬁrst T periods, Π( ˜ f∗
n,T)c o n v e r g e st oΠ( ˜ fT). Combining this with
continuity at inﬁnity of the payoﬀ function implies that Π( ˜ f)=Π∗. Hence, there exists a T
such that |Π( ˜ fT) − Π( ˜ f∗
T)| < ²
4.
⇒ Π( ˆ fT) − Π( ˜ fT) − (Π( ˜ f
∗




Π( ˆ fT) − Π( ˜ f
∗
T) > 0,
which contradicts the optimality of f∗
T in the game with time horizon T. 2
When players have identical payoﬀs, as in the repeated success-or-failure game, it is
intuitive that optimal attainable strategy combinations are Nash equilibria. The following
result conﬁr m st h i si n t u i t i o n .
Proposition 2 Any optimal attainable strategy in a repeated success-or-failure game with
discounting is a Nash equilibrium strategy.5
5CH prove an analogous result for repeated coordination games without payoﬀ uncertainty.
7The proof makes use of the fact that preferences over strategy proﬁles have utility func-
tion representation and, more speciﬁcally, that this representation has the von Neumann-
Morgenstern form. We will show later that without this assumption there may be no attain-
able Nash equilibrium in the repeated success-or-failure game, even if we permit the use of
mixed strategies.
Proof. f∗ is an optimal attainable strategy proﬁle if it solves maxf∈FT Π(f). If f∗ is not





Note that because the game is symmetric, it is without loss of generality to consider only
deviations of player one. Since actions are payoﬀ equivalent as long as they have not been
taken, it is also without loss of generality to let ˆ f1 be an attainable strategy. Consider a
strategy ˜ f in which each player plays f∗ with probability 1 − ² and ˆ f with probability ².
Denote the common payoﬀ from m players using strategy ˆ f and the remaining n−m players
using strategy f∗ by Πm,n( ˆ f;f∗); this uses the fact that preferences over strategy proﬁles


























Here, we use the fact that the utility function representing preferences has the von Neumann-
Morgenstern form. For small ² the third term on the right of the equation is at least a
magnitude smaller than the second term. Hence,
Π( ˜ f) > Π(f
∗)
for suﬃciently small ², which contradicts our assumption of f∗ being an optimal attainable
strategy. 2
Combining propositions 1 and 2, we immediately obtain the following existence result for
attainable equilibria.
Corollary 1 An optimal attainable Nash equilibrium strategy exists in any repeated success-
or-failure game.
84 The Solution for the Three-Period Case
In this section, we study the three-period game with two actions per player, n players and k
success proﬁles under the assumption that the n players discount the future with an identical
constant discount factor δ. We assume that the number of success locations is less than the
total number of n-tuples available to the players minus 1, i.e., k<2n −1, to ensure that an
individual player cannot guarantee a success in the three-period game.
For tractability reasons, here and in the following sections, we conﬁne ourselves to the case
where players each have two actions. In that case, our two attainability conditions amount to
players using identical switching probabilities, given identical switching histories. Let a “1”
denote a switch from one action to another and a “0” no such switch. Deﬁne W := {0,1}.
Then a player’s “relevant history” at time t =1 ,2,... is an element of W t−1 × St−1, the
history of his own switches and of the (publicly observable) failures and successes. We can




Our condition (2) for attainability implies that players use switching strategies. Condition
(1) implies that these switching strategies have to be identical. We will therefore study pairs
of identical switching strategies and see which ones are optimal and which ones are in Nash
equilibrium.
Since it suﬃces to study switching strategies in the two-action case and since the initial
choice probabilities are determined by the attainability constraint, each player’s strategy in
the three-period game can be summarized by the triple (p,q0,q 1), where p is the probability
of switching in period one, which is the ﬁr s tp e r i o di nw h i c hp l a y e r sc a ns w i t c h ,q0 is the
probability of switching in period two conditional on no switch in the previous period, and q1
is the probability of switching in period two conditional on a switch in the previous period.
The following result establishes the existence of a unique optimal attainable strategy.
The proof is constructive and determines the optimal values of p, q0 and q1 as functions of
the discount factor, δ, the number of players, n, and the number of success proﬁles, k.
Proposition 3 In the three-period repeated failure-or-success game with two actions per
player, common discount factor δ,nplayers, and k success proﬁles, there exists a unique

















































2n−1 (1 − (1 − q0)
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For p = 0, the conditionally optimal value of q0 is 1, giving ˜ π(0,1,q 1)=2n−k
2n δ.I n
contrast, for p =1 ,˜ π(1,q 0,q 1) ≥ 2n−k
2n .T h i si m p l i e st h a tp = 0 cannot be part of an optimal
strategy.
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Hence, the corresponding ﬁrst order condition has a unique solution, q1 = 1
2.O n ea l s oe a s i l y
checks that the second derivative is negative.
10Next, we consider the optimal solution for q0.I fp ∈ (0,1), then the partial derivative of




















1 (1 − q0)
n−j−1
+(n − j)(1− q1)





In the case where p ∈ (0,1), this derivative is positive for all values of q0 that are less than
one. Hence, in that case the optimal value of q0 is 1. If p =1 ,t h e nq0 is unrestricted. Hence,
the optimal value satisﬁes q∗
0 = 1 if we can show that p∗ ∈ (0,1). This is the question to
which we turn next.
Finally, we consider the solution for p. Using the solutions to q0 and q1, the partial
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One easily checks that the second derivative is negative for all feasible values of p. Hence, a
solution to the ﬁrst-order condition is a global optimum. The ﬁrst-order condition implies
((1 − p)
n−1 − δ(1 − p)
n−1)
+δ(1 − p)
n−12n − 1 − k
2n − 2
− δp




1 +( 1− q1)
n)=0 .











δ(2n − 1 − k)(qn
1 +( 1− q1)n)
(1 − δ)(2n − 2) + δ(2n − 1 − k)
.
After taking the (n − 1)th root, using q1 = 1















It is interesting to compare this solution for the three-period game with the optimal
attainable strategy for the two-period game. In the two period-game, we only have to
determine the switching probability, p, in the second period. Since we want to minimize
the probability (1 − p)2 that the ﬁrst-period action proﬁle is revisited, p = 1 is uniquely
optimal. In contrast, in the three-period game it is optimal to sacriﬁce some second-period
success probability in order to improve the probability of a better starting position in the
third period.
Since every optimal attainable strategy is an equilibrium strategy, the strategy identiﬁed
in the last result is an attainable equilibrium strategy. Since it is unique, it is also the unique
optimal attainable equilibrium strategy. The following result shows that uniqueness is pre-
served even if we drop the optimality requirement. There is a unique attainable equilibrium
strategy.
Proposition 4 In the three-period repeated failure-or-success game with two actions per
player, common discount factor δ,nplayers, and k success proﬁles, there exists a unique






with the optimal attainable strategy.
Proof. F i r s tc o n s i d e rt h ev a l u eo fp.S u p p o s et h a tp =1 .T h e np l a y e ri can guarantee that
in the ﬁnal period a new action combination is used by defecting to the strategy (0,q 0 =1 ,q 1).
Hence p = 1 is never a part of an attainable equilibrium strategy. Suppose instead that
p =0 . Player i gains by deviating to (p =1 ,q 0,q 1), which raises the probability of using a
new action combination in period one from zero to one, without aﬀecting the probability of
a new action combination in the ﬁnal period. Hence, p = 0 is never part of the attainable
equilibrium strategy.
So, in any attainable equilibrium strategy p ∈ (0,1). Since there is positive probability
that at least one player i does not switch in the second period, at least one other player j
does switch. This implies that it is uniquely optimal for player i to set qi
0 =1 .
12Since there is positive probability that player i switches in the second period, qi
1 must be
optimal in the third period. Recall that by symmetry, pj6=i = pi for all j. Against (p,q0,q 1),
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Consequently, if q1 is greater than 1
2, it is uniquely optimal not to switch in period two
following a switch in period one, i.e., to deviate to q1 =0 .C o n v e r s e l y ,i fq1 is less than 1
2,i t
is uniquely optimal to switch in period two following a switch in period one, i.e. to deviate
to q1 = 1. Thus, the only possibility for q1 to be optimal is that q1 = 1
2. Indeed, q1 = 1
2
equates the payoﬀs from switching and not switching following a switch.
Since p ∈ (0,1) in any attainable equilibrium strategy, player i’s payoﬀ from switching
in the second period must be identical to the payoﬀ from not switching. Player i’s payoﬀ
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Equating the payoﬀs from switching in the second period and from not switching in the
second period and using the fact that q0 =1 ,w eg e t
13(−(1 − p)
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n).
After eliminating matching terms on both sides of the equation, we are left with
(−(1 − p)




= δ(1 − p)
n−12n − 1 − k
2n − 1
− δp




1 +( 1− q1)
n).
Now, one can easily check that this equation is equivalent to the ﬁrst-order condition that
determined p∗(δ,n,k) as part of the unique optimal attainable strategy. 2
Note that in the unique attainable Nash equilibrium, agents condition their behavior on
their own past actions, which are not publicly observable. Therefore no public attainable
Nash equilibrium exists in our game. There has been some recent work on the eﬀects of
restricting the analysis of games with imperfect monitoring to public equilibria. Fudenberg,
Levine and Maskin [1994] obtain a Folk Theorem in perfect public strategies for games
with imperfect public monitoring as long as the public signal permits statistical detection
of individual deviations. In contrast, Radner, Myerson and Maskin [1986] show that perfect
public equilibrium payoﬀs are uniformly bounded away (in the discount factor) from the
eﬃcient frontier in repeated partnership games with discounting, while Radner [1986] shows
that eﬃciency can be attained in repeated partnership games without discounting. Recently
Obara [2000] has shown that the equilibrium payoﬀs obtainable with perfect public strategies
in the Radner-Myerson-Maskin example can be improved upon by permitting players to
condition their behavior on their own past actions, which are not publicly observable. Thus,
Obara shows that the restriction to public strategies may constrain eﬃciency, while our
example shows that this restriction in conjunction with the attainability requirement can
rule out existence.
Simple inspection of p∗(δ,n,k) yields a number of interesting comparative statics predic-
tions.
14Proposition 5 In the three-period repeated failure-or-success game with two actions per
player, common discount factor δ,nplayers, and k success proﬁl e s ,t h eu n i q u eo p t i m a la n d
equilibrium value of the second-period switching probability p is a monotonic function of δ,n
and k. The function p∗(δ,n,k) ( 1 )i ss t r i c t l yd e c r e a s i n gi nδ, ( 2 )i ss t r i c t l yd e c r e a s i n gi nn,
( 3 )i ss t r i c t l yd e c r e a s i n gi nn even if k
2n is kept constant, (4) is strictly increasing in k, (5)
converges to 2
3 as δ → 1, (6) converges to 1 as δ → 0, and (7) converges to 2
3 as n →∞ .
For the three-period case, the proposition summarizes how agents’ responses to failure
in an organization vary with the fundamentals that characterize the organization. Since the
third-period switching probabilities do not vary with the parameters, the proposition focuses
on the switching probability in the second period, following a failure in the initial period. In
the three-period model all three parameters, i.e., the discount factor, the number of agents
in the organization, and the initial success probability, aﬀect this switching probability; this
contrasts with the two-period case where agents always prefer to switch with probability
one following a failure.6 We infer the following from the proposition: (1) Agents in the
organization respond more slowly to failure as the future becomes more important. Rather
than always immediately seizing a new success opportunity, agents take into account how
their behavior aﬀects the point of departure in the next period if they do not succeed in
the present period. (2) Agents respond more slowly to failure as the size of the organization
increases. The larger the organization, the greater is the incentive to rely on others for
change. Note that the beneﬁt from relying on others does not derive from free-riding but from
the increased probability of generating asymmetries. (3) The eﬀect of increasing organization
size on agents’ responses to failure remains the same even if the ap r i o r isuccess probability
is kept constant. This can be interpreted as meaning that the size eﬀect remains even if large
organizations have the same technology as small ones. Since the eﬀect of size on reactivity
is strictly negative in this case, it would remain so even if larger organizations had slightly
better technologies. (4) Agents in the organization respond faster to failure as the success
probability is increased. (5) Even very patient agents change their behavior with positive
6It is diﬃcult to obtain analytical and even numerical solutions for four and more periods. We have
explored the four-period case for n = 2 and k =1 . In that case, the comparative statics for δ remain the
same as in the three-period case. We expect that at least for moderate discount factors, adding more periods
does not aﬀect our comparative statics results too much. For small discount factors, n =2a n dk =1 , the
inﬁnite horizon case is analyzed in the following section.
15probability. (6) Very impatient agents seek immediate success. (7) Even in a very large
organization agents respond to failure with a probability that is bounded away from zero.
5T h e I n ﬁnite Horizon Case
For large T, the analysis of the general version of the repeated success-and-failure game
becomes increasingly intractable, even if we limit ourselves to two players, two actions and
a single success pair, as we will from here on. It turns out, however, that for small discount
factors we can approximately characterize the solution for any horizon. The case of small
discount factors is interesting because, unlike in the case of ordinary repeated games, there
are signiﬁcant intertemporal links no matter how small the discount factor. Indeed, the
analysis of the limit lays bare the role of information in determining play.
For expositional purposes, we formulate our results for the inﬁnite horizon. Statements
and proofs apply to any horizon with hardly any changes. Our approach will be to identify the
solution for δ = 0 and then to argue that any solution for small but positive δ approximates
the solution for δ =0 . Some care is required in order to discuss in a meaningful way optimal
attainable strategies when δ =0 . In particular, we want to get restrictions on behavior not
just in the ﬁrst period. For that reason we employ a mild sequential optimality condition:
We require an optimal attainable strategy to remain optimal attainable after every positive
probability history. The same holds for equilibrium attainable strategies. For δ > 0, this
condition is automatically satisﬁed. Thus, it is natural to maintain it in studying optimal
solutions in the limit.
To state the next result, we need to introduce switching probabilities conditional on sets
of histories. By deﬁnition, a switching strategy σ speciﬁes a switching probability σ(ht)
conditional on each individual history ht ending in period t − 1. In addition, for any set
of histories Hαt ending in period t − 1 that has positive probability under σ we can deﬁne
an aggregate switching probability, the probability of switching conditional on the history
being in the set Hαt; α is an index that is either “odd” or “even” and will later be used
to diﬀerentiate between the set of length t − 1 histories with an even number and an odd
number of switches. Let ρ(ht,σ) denote the probability of history ht that is induced by
switching strategy σ, and deﬁne the probability of history ht conditional on being in the

















Note that for any σ-positive-probability set Hαt the switching probability conditional on Hαt
is independent of the speciﬁcation of switching probabilities after individual histories that
are in Hαt but have probability zero under σ. Deﬁne the set Het of histories with an even
number of switches and the set Hot of histories with an odd number of switches, and call the
switching probabilities conditional on these sets, when they are well-deﬁned, the switching
probability conditional on even and odd histories, respectively.
Proposition 6 In the inﬁnite horizon repeated failure-or-success game with two actions per
player, common discount factor δ =0 , 2 players, and 1 success proﬁle, (1) there exists a
public optimal attainable strategy σ∗ that prescribes switching with probability one in odd
periods and with probability one-half in even periods; and, (2) in every optimal attainable
strategy σ the switching probability is one in odd periods, and in even periods both the switch-
ing probability conditional on odd histories and the switching probability conditional on even
histories equal one-half.
Proof. We show that any attainable strategy σ whose switching probabilities conditional
on odd and even histories equal one-half in even periods and whose switching probability
in odd periods equals one is an optimal attainable strategy. We proceed by induction. We
ﬁrst show that switching with probability one is uniquely optimal in period one and that
conditional on having switched with probability one in period one, it is uniquely optimal
to switch with probability one-half in period two. We then show for any t that if σ is as
speciﬁed until period t−1 then it is uniquely optimal to satisfy the speciﬁcation in period t.
Recall that the initial, 0 period, randomization is constrained to assigning probability
one-half to either action. If the 0-period-action pair was not successful, switching with
probability one is the only way to ensure that the same pair will not be chosen in period
171. Since all other action pairs are equally likely to be the success pair, minimizing the
probability of repeating the ﬁrst-round choices is uniquely o p t i m a li np e r i o do n e .I ft h e r ei s
a unique optimal switching probability in a given period, δ = 0 requires that this switching
probability be part of any optimal strategy.
Without success prior to period 2, the goal in period 2 is to minimize the probability of
repeating the two ﬁrst-round choice pairs. A new action pair will be chosen exactly when
one player switches and the other does not. Denoting the switching probability in period
2b yσ2, the probability of success in that period is 1
2σ2(1 − σ2), which is again uniquely
maximized with a switching probability of one-half.
A similar argument applies after any success-free history conforming with σ in which the
last switch was a probability one switch. The argument is slightly diﬀerent because we have
to allow players to condition their switching probabilities on their individual histories.
Let period t be even. Since period t is even, by assumption both players switched with
probability one in the preceding period. Since we are in period four or higher, there have
been at least two simultaneous probability-one switches. Hence it is impossible to have
reached the current period without success while one player’s history is even and the other
player’s history is odd. Thus, either both players’ histories are even, or they are both odd.
Therefore, given that σ is as speciﬁed in the proposition until period t− 1, with probability
one-half both players’ histories are in Het, and otherwise they are both in Hot. In either case,
in order to have a chance for a success one of the players has to switch while the other stays
put. There are two ways in which this can happen, and if it does there is a one-half chance




































It remains to show that if t i so d da n dg i v e nt h a tσ has been followed until period
t−1, it is uniquely optimal to switch with probability one in period t. By assumption, both
18players switched with probability one-half in period t−1 and with probability one in period
t − 2. Conditional on no success in period t − 1, a precondition for arriving in period t,
the probability of being at one of the two action pairs visited in periods t − 3a n dt − 2i s
two-thirds and the probability of being at one of the remaining action pairs is one-third. In
the two-thirds case, for a success to be possible one of the players must switch while the
other stays put. With probability one-half this happens when both players’ histories are
even (odd), in which case there are two ways in which it can happen, both of which have
success probability one-half. In the one-third case, there is certain success if and only if both
players switch. Hence, if t is odd and σ has been followed until period t−1, then the success


















































Either both switching probabilities equal one, and we are done, or the sum of both
derivatives is positive. Suppose the latter holds. Since the sum of the two expressions is
positive, at least one of them must be positive. Suppose
∂Π(t)
∂σ(Het) > 0 at the optimum, then




3σ(Hot), which is strictly greater than zero unless
σ(Hot) = 1 as well. Thus, in either case σ(Hot)=1 . Since the argument is symmetric, it
has to be the case that σ(h)=1∀h ∈ Het and σ(h)=1∀h ∈ Hot. 2
The optimal attainable strategy of switching in odd periods and randomizing with prob-
ability one-half in even periods conditions only on time and is therefore a public strategy.
This contrasts with the case of δ > 0 and three-periods, where the unique optimal attainable
strategy made behavior-contingent on players’ own past switches.
19Proposition 7 If we let σ(Het;δ) denote the switching probability after even histories under





for α = e,o, t =1 ,2,...and δn → 0.










where σt is the vector of history-dependent switching probabilities in period t and πt(...)
is the probability of success in period t as a function of all probability choices that aﬀect
period t, i.e., all those prior to and in period t. Each πt(...) is a polynomial and therefore
continuous.
We proceed by induction on t. Recall from the previous result that σ(Hα1;0) is uniquely
determined in any solution to the problem of maximizing π1(σ1). In other words, for any
alternative strategy ˜ σ such that ˜ σ(Hα1;0)6= σ(Hα1;0), we have
π1(σ1) − π1(˜ σ1) >²
for some ²>0. Therefore
Π(σ,δ) − Π(˜ σ,δ) > δ² − δ
2,
w h e r ew eu s et h ef a c tt h a tt h em a x i m u mp a y o ﬀ in the game is one, corresponding to im-
mediate success, and that payoﬀs are bounded below by zero. Hence, as soon as δ <² ,we
have
Π(σ,δ) − Π(˜ σ,δ) > 0,
which establishes our claim for t =1 .
Suppose the claim holds for any τ <t .We will show that it holds for period t. We
know from the previous result that if σ(Hατ;0) = 1 for α = e,o and all odd τ <t ,and
σ(Hατ;0) = 1
2 for α = e,o and all even τ <t ,then any attainable σt that maximizes
πt(σ1,...,σt−1,σt) must satisfy the same two conditions with t replacing τ.
20Consider a sequence {σ(δn)} of optimal attainable strategies corresponding to a sequence




Then there exists an η and a subsequence {δnk} of {δn} such that
|σ(H
αt;δnk) − σ(H
αt;0)| > η ∀k =1 ,2,....
Then σ(δnk) has a convergent subsequence, which after reindexing we also denote by {σ(δnk)}.




From the previous result, there exists an ²>0 such that
π(σ1(0),...,σt−1(0),σt(0)) − π(σ1(0),...,σt−1(0), ˜ σt) >² .
Thus, using the fact that
˜ σ(H
ατ)=σ(H
ατ;0) ∀ τ <t ,
we get
Π(σ(0),δ) − Π(˜ σ,δ) >² δ
t − δ
t+1.
Therefore, for any δ <² ,we get
Π(σ(0),δ) − Π(˜ σ,δ) > 0
such that convergence of σ(δnk)t o˜ σ and the continuity of Π imply that for all suﬃciently
large k
Π(σ(0),δnk) − Π(σ(δnk),δnk) > 0
which contradicts the presumed optimality of σ(δnk). 2
Since we proved earlier that every optimal attainable strategy is an equilibrium strategy,
we immediately infer that the simple public strategy that is optimal attainable for δ =0i s
also an equilibrium strategy.
21Corollary 2 With an inﬁnite time horizon and δ =0 , there exists an equilibrium attainable
strategy in which both players switch with probability one in even periods and with probability
one-half in odd periods.
In the discounting case, there is a simple intuitive link between optimality and equi-
librium for attainable strategies. Lest the reader think this is obvious we note that this
link disappears if we replace discounting with δ = 0 by a lexicographic preference for early
success.
For any two sequences of expected stage-game payoﬀso fp l a y e ri, πi and ˆ πi, deﬁne
t




τ ∀τ <t }.
We say that player i lexicographically prefers the sequence πi of expected stage-game payoﬀs
to the sequence ˆ πi, πi Âi ˆ πi, if and only if πi
t∗ > ˆ πi
t∗.
Proposition 8 With lexicographic preferences for early success, the inﬁnitely repeated game
does not have an attainable Nash equilibrium.
Proof. To derive a contradiction, suppose there is such an equilibrium. The attainability
restrictions on strategies imply that in the initial (0 period) players uniformly randomize
over their actions. If players’ switching probability in period one is less than one, each
player’s unique best reply is to switch with probability one. Thus, the only candidate for an
attainable equilibrium requires players to switch with probability one in period one. Then,
the switching probability in period two cannot equal zero or one because otherwise each
player could gain by deviating to switching with probability one or zero.
Thus in any candidate σ∗ for an attainable Nash equilibrium, the period-one switching
probability is one and the period-two switching probability σ∗
2 (conditional on switching
in period 1) satisﬁes 0 < σ∗
2 < 1. As a consequence, conditional on no success in the
ﬁrst two periods, the expected number of action combinations examined in the ﬁrst three
periods is less than three. However, a player can deviate to the following strategy: switch
with probability zero in period one and with probability one in period two. The success
probabilities in periods zero and one are identical to the equilibrium candidate’s success
probability, and conditional on no success, the number of action combinations examined in
the ﬁrst three periods equal three. 2
226 Related Literature
Interest in organizational learning dates back to at least Cyert and March [1963]. They view
an organization as an “information gathering and decision-rendering system” and share with
Simon [1947] the emphasis on decision processes in organizations. According to them, some
problems are routine and handled by “standard operating procedures.” If problems change,
routines are adjusted through learning. Organizations search for better solutions, and search
order itself changes according to success and failure with a given search order in problems
of the same type. Cyert and March also point out that the code or language in which an
organization frames its problems changes through experience.
Simon views the organization as composed of boundedly rational agents and Cyert and
March refer to the ﬁrm as an adaptively rational system. Much of the recent work on
organizational learning is in this tradition. While we share the interest in how information
is processed and decisions are rendered, the present paper explores what we can learn from a
fully rational learning perspective. To the extent that equilibrium matters for the bounded
rationality approach, one can perhaps characterize it as learning an equilibrium, whereas we
investigate learning in equilibrium.
Organizational learning diﬀers from individual learning because of decentralization of
information and decisions. Because of decentralization of decisions, the learning activity
of some agents may confound and frustrate the learning of others. This perspective on
organizational learning is in line with the transaction cost view of the ﬁrm and in contrast
with the neoclassical view of the ﬁrm as a single decision maker. Because of decentralized
learning activities, organizational learning poses a complex coordination problem. Ideally,
to learn eﬃciently, the organization may have to induce an intricate pattern of contingent
decisions by its members. If decision making is diﬀuse, this may be next to impossible.
To formally represent the problem posed by decentralization, it is necessary but not
suﬃcient to model the ﬁrm as a collection of independent strategic agents, i.e., a game.
If we ignore conﬂicts of interest in the organization, the intricate decision pattern alluded
to above may well be a Nash equilibrium of this game. The problem though is how to
achieve the necessary coordination. In order to capture what diﬀerentiates organizational
from individual learning, we need to formalize the constraints that decentralization imposes
23on the organization’s ability to coordinate on an eﬃcient learning equilibrium.
We model the decentralization constraints as lack of a common language. Following
Crawford and Haller [1990], lack of a common language for a set of objects (e.g., actions
in a game or decisions and agents in an organization) can be represented via symmetry
restrictions on agents’ beliefs about the strategies of other agents. One can modulate the
symmetry constraints to represent various degrees of severity of the decentralization con-
straints. In addition, the history of repeated interaction in the organization may help in
(partially) removing symmetry constraints. Thus part of the learning process consists of the
construction of a common language to label decisions and agents in the organization.
We study the role of decentralization constraints for an organization that gathers informa-
tion about which action proﬁles are optimal. The generation and processing of information is
central to organizational activity. Prescott and Visscher [1980] go as far as saying that “The
manner in which information is accumulated in the ﬁrm oﬀers an explanation for the ﬁrm’s
existence.” In Prescott and Visscher’s setting a central agency in the organization accumu-
lates the information. In our setting information entirely resides with the individual agents
in the organization. Thus we are considering problems facing the “several-person ﬁrm” de-
scribed by Marschak [1960], where each decision maker “decides about diﬀerent things and
on the basis of diﬀerent information.” Marschak [1960] and Milgrom and Roberts [1990a,b]
emphasize independent decision making and the role of complementarities for organizational
form. Marschak emphasizes the possibility of managers “step[ping] on each other’s toes”
and notes that complementarities may play a greater role when successive operations are re-
quired. Noting that there may be multiple optima, he observes that “two or more timetables
are often equally good, but some ‘co-ordinator’ has to choose one.”
The need to newly discover optimal action proﬁles arises in a changing environment. If
these changes are routine, the discovery process may itself follow a possibly complicated
routine, as if it were coordinated by a central agency. If changes are novel, e.g., because
they frequently involve diﬀerent subsets of agents in the organization, new agents in the
organization, or completely new sets of available action, it is less likely that complicated
learning routines develop. We oﬀer a model of individual learning in an organization where
novelty is captured through symmetry. In a novel situation agents are likely to lack at
24least some of the common distinctions necessary to implement intricate asymmetric learning
schemes. The case of extreme symmetry, without any common distinctions of actions and
agents, can be viewed as a benchmark for the value of coordination and of corporate culture.
Organizations need to learn to overcome absence of a common language each time they
encounter novel circumstances. Recurrent novelty provides a role for (corporate) culture
to guide this learning process. Culture can be viewed as a partial language, with some of
the symmetries removed. It can serve as a focal point, Schelling [1960], in unanticipated
situations. This is in line with Kreps’ [1990] discussion of corporate culture as an answer to
coordination diﬃculties that arise due to novel circumstances, or “unforeseen contingencies.”
Both Cr´ emer [1993] and Hermalin [2000] make the connection between corporate culture and
a common language. Cr´ emer deﬁnes culture as common language plus shared knowledge of
facts plus shared knowledge of simple rules. Hermalin [2000] argues that both coordination
issues and unforeseen contingencies justify a role for culture. He adopts a partition view of
a partial language that is consistent with our and Crawford and Haller’s [1990] approach of
using (partial) symmetry to express (partial) lack of a common language. Corporate culture
assists organizational learning by labeling agents and decisions and thereby providing a
scaﬀold for the construction of intricate learning schemes.
Crawford and Haller’s approach to modeling language constraints through symmetry
has been further developed and used in a number of recent papers. Blume [2000] studies
partial languages with structure akin to a grammar or culture that enhances the use of the
language in coordination and learning. Rubinstein [1996, 2000] uses an alternative approach
for studying structure in language through properties of binary relations. Kramarz [1996]
e x t e n d sC H ’ sw o r kt on-player games. Bhaskar [2000] applies CH’s approach to a game
with conﬂict, the inﬁnitely repeated Battle of the Sexes. Alpern and Reyniers [2000] study
attainable strategies, subject to additional Markov restrictions, in games with many players
whose goal is to disperse themselves among a ﬁnite set of locations.
Symmetry and language construction have also been looked at in the experimental liter-
ature. Blume, DeJong, Kim and Sprinkle [1998, 2001] experimentally study the emergence
of meaning for ap r i o r imeaningless messages in repeated sender-receiver games. Blume and
Gneezy [2000] ﬁnd evidence for attainability in cognitively simple games. Blume and Gneezy
25[2001] show that the attainability idea can also be used in settings where players do not have
common knowledge of the language they are using. They show that players form beliefs
about each other’s languages and use cognitive forward induction, i.e., signal their language
if given the opportunity. Weber and Camerer [2001] use a language construction experiment
to study conﬂicting organizational cultures in the laboratory. In the experiment, “ﬁrms”
develop some common language and are then merged. As one might expect, performance
deteriorates immediately after the merger as a result of the conﬂict cultures, or local idioms.
It takes time for the languages to be harmonized again.
Language provides both the means for communicating within the organization and the
shared concepts used by members to infer how others think within the organization. While
in this paper we focus on language constraints as constraints on common concepts in orga-
nizations, the importance of similar constraints on communication in organizations has been
noted as well. The philosopher Putnam [1973] formulates the “hypothesis of the universality
of the division of linguistic labor.” Arrow [1974] stresses the local nature of an organization’s
code and links diﬀerences in codes to multiple equilibria and history dependence. Nelson
and Winter [1982] speak of the “internal language of communication in an organization.”
Learning in environments with multiple independent decision makers has recently at-
tracted attention across a wide array of disciplines and with a large number of diﬀerent
approaches. Computer scientists, e.g., Sen and Sekaran [1998], Huhns and Weiss [1998] (for
a brief survey) and Wellman and Hu [1998], have studied multi-agent learning, often with
adaptive routines, such as reinforcement learning. On the boundary of computer science and
psychology, there is work on collaborative learning, Dillenbourg [1999], which is, for example,
interested in the “co-construction of a common language” (culture) in environments charac-
terized by action symmetry, shared goals, and low division of labor into sub-tasks. Within
cognitive science, there has been interest in distributed cognition, e.g., Hutchins [1995] and
Hollan, Hutchins and Kirsh [1999]. This work emphasizes that the relevant cognitive entity
is not necessarily the individual and studies organizational learning from this perspective.
Organizational learning is also addressed in the strategic management literature; for a dis-
cussion of that literature and its link with the economics literatures on learning and the
ﬁrm see, for example, Boerner, Macher and Teece [2000]. Closely related to the computer
26science work on multi-agent learning, there is work on organizational learning in computa-
tional organization theory, e.g., Carley [1998] and Carley and Hill [2001]. One of the themes
there is to view organizations as synthetic agents, with knowledge existing in their culture
and structure. Another branch of organization theory has been concerned with how to opti-
mally structure hierarchies that search for optimal production plans, e.g., Beckmann [1977]
and Keren and Levhari [1983]. Radner [1993] under some conditions derives hierarchies as
eﬃcient structures for decentralized information processing in organizations.
The bulk of the work just described invokes some kind of bounded rationality of the
agents and sometimes argues that the cognitive ability of an organization may transcend
that of the agents comprising it. In contrast, the present paper assumes that agents are
fully rational and obtains its predictions from the interplay of rational learning, limited
observability, and symmetry constraints. Fully rational learning in strategic settings is also
investigated in the literature on many-agent versions of the multi-armed bandit problem,
Bolton and Harris [1999], games with unknown payoﬀ distributions, Wiseman [2000], and
the literature on informational herding, e.g., Banerjee [1992] and Bikchandani, Hirshleifer
and Welch [1992].
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